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Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in the Union Workplace After
Wright v. UniversalMaritimeService Corp.
DANIEL Roy"

INTRODUCTION
During the last eight years, an increasing number of employees who want to file
federal employment discrimination claims against their employers in court have
found themselves unable to do so.' Ever since the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.' in 1991, more and more employers
require their workers to agree to mandatory arbitration clauses, whether contained
injob applications or employee handbooks, as a condition of employment 3 These

clauses generally compel the employee to submit any dispute arising out of his or
her employment to binding arbitration, and courts usually hold that these clauses
require arbitration of employees' statutory claims." Indeed, the result in Gilmer sent

employers scurrying to sign up their employees to arbitration clauses in hopes of
avoiding the high cost of litigating employment discrimination suits.'
This recent surge in the use of mandatory arbitration to resolve statutory

employment claims, however, has been limited almost exclusively to the non-union
workplace. Despite Gilmer, and the strong tradition of arbitration's use in the
unionized workplace," most courts currently hold that mandatory arbitration clauses

*
).D.Candidate, 1999, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; BA4, 1996,
DePauwUniversity. Iwould like to thank Professor Terry Bethel for helping me to find and better
understand this issue. I owe a special debt of gratitude that I can never repay to those who have
somehow tolerated my strange behavior during these three years of law school: Mom, Dad, Mad,
Rabecca, and, especially, Jena.
1. See Lucille M. Ponte, In the Shadow ofGilmer How Post-GilmerLegal Challengesto
Pre-DisputeArbitrationAgreementsPointthe Way Towards GreaterFairnessin Employment
Arbitration,12 Oio ST.J.ONDISP. RESOL. 359,360 (1997).
2. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative)
Forum: ReexaminingAlexanderv. Gardner-Denver in the Wake ofGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 1997 BYUL. REV.591,591-92; Ponte, supra note 1, at 360.
4. The arbitration clause in Gilmer, for example, required Mr. Gilmer to arbitrate "'[a]ny
controversy... arising out of the employment or termination of employment' Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 23 (quoting App. to Brief for Respondent at 1). This language is consistent with the terms
recommended for use in mandatory arbitration clauses found in employment contracts. See Robert
K. Sholl & Christian A. Jenkins,Agreements to ArbitrateStatutory Employment Claims,Wis.
LAW., Apr. 1998, at 15, 17 (suggesting that arbitration agreements require arbitration of"[a]ll
disputes arising out of Employee's employment or the termination thereof).
5. See Cole, supra note 3, at 591-92; Ponte, supra note 1, at 360.
6. In 1960, the Supreme Court, in a collection of cases commonly referred to as the
Steelworkers Trilo, endorsed the use oflabor arbitration. See United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Since
that time, the use of labor arbitration (i.e., arbitration between unions and management) has
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contained in collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") do not require unionized
employees to arbitrate their statutory claims.7 As the basis for this distinction
between the union and non-union workplace, courts cite the Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. in 1974.8 In Gardner-Denver,the
Court held that an employee represented by a union who had lost his wrongful
discharge claim in arbitration could still bring a Title VII race discrimination suit
related to his firing in federal court. In doing so, the Court reasoned that arbitration
was an improper means for resolving statutory claims, and that an employee could
never prospectively waive the right to bring a Title VII suit.' As a result, during
the years following Gardner-Denver,it was considered "hornbook labor law"" that
mandatory arbitration clauses, while covering other claims, did not require
employees to submit their statutory claims to binding arbitration.' 2
By the time Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. was decided some
seventeen years later, however, the Court had changed its tune on the propriety of
arbitration as a means to resolve statutory claims-at least in part. 3 In Gilmer, the
Court held that the non-union employee in that case was required to arbitrate his
statutory age discrimination claim because of the mandatory arbitration clause he
had signed as a condition of his employment.' 4 In reaching this conclusion, the
Gilmer Court rejected the two major premises underlying the Gardner-Denver
decision-that arbitration is an improper forum for resolving statutory claims," and
that employees can never prospectively waive their right to bring suit under a
statutory claim. 6 In fact, the Court in Gilmer praised the virtues of arbitration, and

become "almost universal." Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatiringJustice: A
JurisprudentialPerspectiveon LaborandEmploymentArbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy
toGilmer,44 HAsTliNGS L.J. 1187,1187 (1993). Indeed, arbitration agreements are contained in
some 98% of collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 1187 n.1. Arbitration as a means of
resolving disputes between employers and employees in the non-union setting, however, is a fairly
recent phenomenon which has emerged only since the Court's Gilmer decision.
7. See Robert B. Htzpatrick, Is Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. the DeathKnell
forAlexander v. Gardner-Denver?, in CU RRMrDEvEmLmOPNTrs IN EMLOYMNTr LAW 85,95-110
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 23, 1998).
8.415 U.S. 36 (1974); Cole, supra note 3, at 593.
9. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 59-60.
10.See id. at 51-58.
11. Paul Salvatore &John F. Fullerton, IIlArbitrationofDiscriminationClaims in the Union
Setting: Revisiting the Tension Between IndividualRights and Collective Representation,14
LAB. LAW. 129, 130 (1998).
12. See Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: A MajorStep Forward
forAlternativeDisputeResolution, or a MeaninglessDecision?,7 LAB. LAW. 823, 823 (1991 )
(explaining that Gilmer was a "dramatic departure" from the long-recognized interpretation of

Gardner-Denver,that "federal civil rights actions are not subject to compulsory arbitration!"); see
also Salvatore & Fullerton, supra note 11, at 130.
13. See Cole, supra note 3, at 593-94.
14. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,27 (1991).
15. See iaat 30-34; see also Martin H. Malin,ArbitratingStatutoryEmployment Claims in
theAfteamath ofGilner,40ST.LouIsU. L.J. 77, 84 (1996) (concluding that the primary basis for
Gardner-Denverwas the Court's mistrust of arbitration, and that this view was rejected in
Gilmer).
16. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-29.
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explained that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims did not undermine any of the
substantive rights of the statute; they just required that the claims be resolved in an
alternative forum.' 7
Gilmerundermined much of Gardner-Denver'sreasoning. Despite this, however,
the Gilmer Court declined to expressly overrule Gardner-Denver.The Court chose
instead to distinguish the two cases, and did so by noting "several important
distinctions" between them"-chief among the distinctions was the fact that the
employee in Gardner-Denver was represented by a union, while the Gilmer
employee was not.' 9 The Gilmer Court explained that representation by a union
could subject an employee to the danger of having his or her individual statutory
rights undermined in favor of the collective rights of the bargaining unit as a
whole. 21 While this had been cited in Gardner-Denveras a reason for not requiring
the employee in that case to arbitrate his statutory claim, it had certainly played a
very small role in doing so. 2' Nevertheless, the general rule that evolved among the
lower courts after Gilmer was that a non-union employee could be required to
arbitrate statutory claims by virtue of a mandatory arbitration clause,
while
22
employees represented by a union and working under a CBA could not.
Although courts generally took this view, they were not, however, unanimous in
doing so.' While the Gilmer opinion kept Gardner-Denveralive, the extent to
which the latter remained truly viable was seriously called into question, as so much
of its reasoning was rejected by Gilmer.24 Thus, while most circuit courts held that
unionized employees could not be required to arbitrate their statutory claims based
on a mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA, the issue of whether such a clause
could ever require union employees to do so could only be resolved by a decision
from the Supreme Court.

17.Id. at26.
18.Id. at35.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
21. See alin, supra note 15, at 84.
22. Among courts of appeal, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
ruled against applying mandatory arbitration agreements found in CBAs to statutory claims, while
the Fourth Circuit stands alone in enforcing such an agreement ComparePenny v. United Parcel
Sew., 128 F3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997), Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997),
Vamer v. National SuperMkts., Inc., 94 F3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.,
112 F3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997), and Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519
(l1th Cir. 1997), with Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.
1996). The Third Circuit initially decided that a mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA could
compel arbitration ofstatutory claims, but the opinion was later vacated. Thus, it is unclear where
the Third Circuit stands. See Martin v. Dana Corp., 114 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 1997), opinion
withdrawn and vacated, No. 96-1746, 1997 WL 368629 (3d. Cir. July 1, 1997). For a nice
explanation of where the circuits currently stand on the issue, see Harvey R. Boiler & Donald J.
Petersen,JobDiscriminationClaims Under Collective Bargaining,DisP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998,
at 39.
23. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 879-86 (applying a mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA to
statutory claims).
24. See infra Part I.C.
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Many thought that answer would come when the Court recently granted certiorari
to a case out of the Fourth Circuit, Wright v. UniversalMaritime Service Corp. 5
In Wright, a union-represented employee's claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act was dismissed from federal district court because he had not yet
taken it through the union's arbitration process. The district court found that the
CBA's arbitration clause, although general in nature, required the employee to
bring his claim before an arbitrator whose decision would be binding. The Fourth
Circuit-the only appellate court to date that has held that arbitration clauses in
CBAs extend to statutory claims-affrmed the dismissal on appeal. 6 When the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 27 it set the stage for finally resolving Gilmer and
Gardner-Denver,and ruling on the applicability of a CBA arbitration clause to
statutory claims.
But the Supreme Court never reached the issue. It found instead that even if a
mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA could bind unionized employees to arbitrate
their statutory claims, the clause in Wright did not meet the standard for doing so.28
As a result, the case provided only limited guidance on the broader issue,
explaining that an arbitration clause in a CBA must be "clear and unmistakable"
that it applies to statutory claims in order to be applied to such claims.29 But, of
course, this rule would apply only if the Court eventually decides that arbitration
clauses in CBAs can be extended to reach statutory claims. Therefore, while the
case provides perhaps one piece to the puzzle, the broader, more significant issue
of whether a unionized employee can in fact be required to arbitrate statutory claims
by virtue of an arbitration clause in a CBA remains an open question after Wright.a°
This Note argues that, so long as the CBA contains "clear and unmistakable"
language that the parties intended for statutory claims to be covered by the
mandatory arbitration clause, union employees should be required to arbitrate such
claims. Although the Court has not overruled Gardner-Denverexplicitly, the
Gilmer opinion rejected most of the reasoning upon which Gardner-Denverwas
based. As a result, the only true remaining justification for applying GardnerDenver, and the primary reason cited by courts for continuing to do so, is the
difference between union and non-union employees.
But the union status of an employee alone is not a sufficient basis for applying
Gardner-Denver.In fact, when the two sets of employees are compared, it becomes
clear that those represented by a union are capable of providing the same kind of
consent to a mandatory arbitration clause as non-union employees. Further, the duty
of fair representation which a union owes to those if represents ensures that those
employees will have their rights vigorously asserted by the union during the

25. See, e.g., Salvatore & Fullerton, supra note 11, at 141 (noting that Wright provided the
Court with a "perfect opportunity" to resolve the issue).
26. See Wight v. UniversalMaritime Serv. Corp.,121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated, 119
S. Ct. 391 (1998).
27. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct 1162 (1998).
28. See Wright, 119 S. Ct at 395.
29. Id. at 396.
30. See Marcia Coyle, High CourtStrikesDownADR Clause, NAT'L LAw J., Nov. 30,1998,
at B1 (commenting that Wright left this issue "unresolved").
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arbitration process. Therefore, so long as the arbitration clause in the CBA meets
the "clear and unmistakable" test, courts should enforce the clauses accordingly.
Part I of this Note looks at the Gardner-Denverand Gilmer decisions. It explains
the Court's reasoning underlying both decisions, identifies what of Gardner-Denver
is left after Gilmer, and explains when and why lower courts continue to apply
Gardner-Denver.
Parts II and III assess whether the bases for Gardner-Denver'scontinued
application are valid. It concludes that the union status of an employee should not
render mandatory arbitration clauses invalid for two reasons: (1) employees
represented by a union are capable of providing consent to such arbitration clauses
in the same manner in which non-union employees do, and (2) unionized employees
are protected by the duty of fair representation from having their individual interests
and rights undermined by the union.
Finally, Part IV explains what kind of language a union-negotiated mandatory
arbitration clause should contain in order to be applied to statutory claims, with
Wright and other case law providing guidance.

I. THE REMAINING BASES FOR GARDNER-DENVER'S
CONTINUED VIAmLiTY AFTER G.HR AND WRIGHT
The first step in examining whether Gardner-Denvershould still be considered
good law is to determine just how much of the decision was left intact after Gilmer.
The courts that continue to recognize Gardner-Denver do so based on the
"distinctions" between the two cases. Once the bases for Gardner-Denver's
continued recognition are identified, their merit can then be evaluated.
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., an African-American employee named
Harrell Alexander was fired from his job as a drill operator. Shortly thereafter,
Alexander filed a grievance under the CBA in effect between his union and
employer, claiming that he had been wrongfully discharged. Although he initially
made no mention of racial discrimination, by the time his case finally came before
the arbitrator, Alexander argued that his firing was racially motivated. The
arbitrator, however, while not specifically addressing the race discrimination claim,
ruled3 1 that Alexander's discharge was for good cause, and declined to reinstate
him.

While his wrongful discharge claim was making its way through the arbitration
process, Alexander had filed a racial discrimination charge with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, which was later turned over to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 2 The EEOC later informed Alexander that it
had failed to find probable cause of a Title VII violation, and that he had the right
to sue within thirty days, which Alexander did. The suit, alleging racial
discrimination in violation of Title VII, was dismissed by the district court. Because

31. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38-42 (1974).
32. See id.at42.
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he had taken his claim to arbitration, the court ruled the arbitrator's resolution of
the matter was binding, and that Alexander was precluded from filing suit The
3
Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, adopting the district court's reasoning.
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, however, and listed a number of reasons
for holding that the arbitrator's ruling did not preclude Alexander from filing a Title
VII claim. At the outset, the Court noted that claiming an employer had violated
terms of a CBA, and charging the employer with running afoul of Title VII were
two entirely different things. It explained that an employee who submits a claim to
arbitration under a CBA does so in order to "vindicate his contractualright,"
whereas an individual who files a Title VII claim in court "asserts independent
statutory rights accorded by Congress."" Simply because both the CBA and Title
VII might have been violated by the same, single action, the Court reasoned, does
not require that the employee be limited to only one forum for bringing the two
distinct claims. Instead,
"both rights" should be "enforced in their respectively
3
appropriate forums."
The Court then proceeded to give a number of reasons why arbitration was most
certainly not an "appropriate forum" for hearing Title VII claims. First, the Court
attacked the qualifications of the arbitrators themselves." It explained that
arbitrators' competence lay in "the law of the shop, not the law of the land."38
Although an arbitrator might have special knowledge of "industrial relations," the
Court reasoned
that "resolution of statutory or constitutional issues" was best left
39
to the courts.
Next, the Court pointed to the procedural deficiencies of arbitration, which it
believed resulted in a "factfinding process" inferior to that found in the courts."0 It
listed several factors in support of its assertion, noting that "the usual rules of
evidence do not apply" in arbitration proceedings, and that "rights and procedures
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination,
and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable." 4' Further,
unlike the courts, arbitrators are not required to explain their rulings. In fact, the
very informality which generally makes it an attractive alternative forum for dispute
resolution 2 led the Court to conclude that arbitration was an "inappropriate forum
for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII." 3 The Court feared that either
the legal issues might be misinterpreted by incompetent arbitrators, or that
important facts might not come to light due to the inadequate procedures of the
arbitration process.

33. See id. at 43; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
34. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 43.
35. Id. at 49-50 (both emphasis added).
36.Id. at50.
37. See Duston, supra note 12, at 829.
38. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 57.
39.Id.
40.Id.
41.Id. at 57-58.
42.See id.at 58.
43.Id. at 56.
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In addition to its distrust of arbitration, the Gardner-DenverCourt also held that
"an employee's rights under Title VII"-in this case, the right to file suit in
court--"may not be waived prospectively," either by the individual or the
employee's union." That Alexander submitted a wrongful discharge claim to
arbitration in no way affected his right to bring a Title VII suit.4" Even if an
employee or union could waive the right to sue under Title VII, however, the Court
explained that the arbitrator in Gardner-Denverwas not authorized to rule on such
a claim. Arbitrators are bound to make their decisions based on the terms of the
CBA, and the Court determined that the CBA in Gardner-Denverdid not call for
the arbitral resolution of Title VII claims." Thus, an arbitrator's decision on the
issue would have been beyond the arbitrator's authority, and unenforceable.47 In
short, the Court held that employees cannot waive their right to sue under Title VII
prospectively, but that even if they could, the CBA at issue in Gardner-Denverdid
not require arbitration of such claims.
Finally, the Court cited one additional reason for allowing Alexander to bring his
claim in court. In a footnote, the Court noted the possibility that a conflict of
interest might exist in a unionized workplace between the statutory rights of
individual employees under Title VII and the collective interest of the employees
represented by a union as a whole. Given the majoritarian nature of collective
bargaining, the Court expressed concern that a union might deal away, or
undermine, an individual's right to bring a Title VII suit in exchange for benefits
for the bargaining unit as a whole. "In arbitration, as in the collective bargaining
process, the interest of the individual employee may be subordinated to the
collective interest of all employees in the bargaining unit."48 If enabled, the Court
feared that a union might sell out individual employees for the good of the unit,
which would undermine the purpose of Title VII. Thus, a union could not be given
the opportunity to do so.
Although the Court laid out a number of factors for refusing to enforce the
arbitration clause to Alexander's statutory claim, the main justification for its
holding in Gardner-Denverwas its distrust of the arbitral forum, and its belief that
arbitration was simply not an appropriate means to resolve Title VII claims.49 Also
important was the Court's holding that Title VII rights, including the right to file
suit, could not be waived prospectively by the employee or the employee's union.
Less important seems to be the fact that the CBA did not authorize the arbitrator to
resolve statutory claims-even if it had, the arbitrator's decision would not have
precluded the employee from filing suit under Title VII. Finally, given its relegation
to a footnote, the "tension" between collective interests and individual rights

44.Id. at52.
45. See id.
46. See Duston, supra note 12, at 829; Salvatore & Fullerton, supranote 11, at 132.
47. See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 53-54.
48. Id. at 58 n.19.
49. See Malm, supra note 15, at 84.
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appears to have played a relatively minor, though not completely insignificant, role
50
in the outcome of Gardner-Denver.
Although there were many reasons given for Gardner-Denver'sresult,the case
came to stand for one singular proposition-that no employee, neither union nor
non-union, could be compelled to arbitrate any of an assortment of statutory claims
against an employer by virtue of a mandatory arbitration agreement." This rule,
however, was severely undermined when the Court issued its opinion in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane some seventeen years later.
B. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
In 1981, Robert Gilmer was hired by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation as
manager of financial services. As a requirement of his employment, Gilmer applied
to be registered as a securities representative with a number of stock exchanges.
Included in his application was a clause which provided that Gilmer "'agree[d] to
arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy' arising between him and Interstate 'that
is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the
organizations with which"' he registered. 2 The New York Stock Exchange had
such a rule, mandating that arbitration be used to resolve any claim "'arising out of
the employment
or termination of employment"' of registered representatives, such
3
as Gilmer.1
Six years later, in 1987, Gilmer was fired by Interstate. By then sixty-two years
old, Gilmer filed suit in federal district court claiming that he had been terminated
because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA"). Interstate countered with a motion to compel arbitration based
upon the clause in Gilmer's registration application. While the district court denied
the motion, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that "'nothing in the text,
legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA indicat[es] a congressional
intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements.""'4 Gilmer, faced with the
prospect of being unable to bring his action in a judicial forum, took his case to the
Supreme Court.
As his primary line of attack, Gilmer argued that the Court's decision in
Gardner-Denverrendered arbitration agreements, such as the one at issue in his
case, unenforceable with respect to statutory claims." In doing so, he relied on the
Court's "'mistrust of the arbitral process"' so prevalent throughout the GardnerDenver opinion, citing many of the characteristics of arbitration he felt made it an

50. Professor David E. Feller refers to the footnote 19 comment as Gardner-Denver's
"furthermore." David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims
Undera CollectiveBargainingAgreementThe Odd Case of CaesarWright, 16 HoFsTRA LAB.
L.J. 53,58 (1998).
51. See Duston, supra note 12, at 830-31.
52. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (quoting App. at 18
(alteration in original)).
53. Id. (quoting App. to Brief for Respondent at 1).
54. Id at 23-24 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir.
1990) (alteration added)).
55. See id. at 26-33.
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inappropriate means of resolving his statutory claim. 6 While these arguments had
carried the day in Gardner-Denver,however, the Gilmer Court now rejected them.
In doing so, it abandoned wholesale Gardner-Denver'ssuspicion of arbitration,
categorizing those views as outdated, and noting that any mistrust of arbitration
expressed in that opinion had "been undermined by our recent arbitration
decisions." 7 Indeed, in the years leading up to Gilmer, the Court had started to
change its tune toward arbitration, viewing it in an increasingly favorable light, and
even enforcing agreements to arbitrate a number of statutory claims."
The applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") to Gilmer's arbitration
agreement also accounted for the Court's new views on arbitration. It noted that the
FAA "reflects a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."' 59 In
holding that "[ilt is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA,"6 the Court made it clear
that Gilmer's arguments regarding the possible bias of arbitration panels,
inadequacy of procedural tools in arbitration, lack of written opinions by
arbitrators, and lack of adequate relief available to employees were rejected.'
While a specific showing of one or more of these problems in a particular case
might possibly result in an arbitration clause going unenforced,62 the Court warned
that "generalized attacks" on arbitration, such as those made by Gilmer (and the

56.IaL at 34 n.5 (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231232 (1987)); see alsoAlexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,49-58 (1974) (discussing
generally the problems it perceived with arbitration of statutory claims).
57. Gibner,500 US. at 34 n.5. The Courtwent on to explain that "'[w]e are well past the time
when judicial suspicion ofthe desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."' Id.
(quoting MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)).
58. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims made under the Securities Act of 1933);
Shearson/Ameriean Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (upholding an arbitration
agreement concerning claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (enforcing an agreement to
arbitrate claims made under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act). For a brief discussion and summary of
these cases,'see Amanda G. Dealy, Note, CompulsoryArbitrationin the Unionized Workplace:
Reconciling Gilmer, Gardner-Denver and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct,37 B.C. L. REV.
479,483-88 (1996).
59. Gilmer,500 U.S. at 35 (quoting MltsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)). The Court stated that the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") was "to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts." Id. at 33.
It should be noted, however, that there is substantial debate as to whether or not the FAA applies
to "employment contracts?"See, e.g., id.at 36-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court sidestepped
the issue, though, by determining that the clause Gilmer signed was not a "contract of
employment" with Interstate, but an agreement with the securities exchanges instead. Id. at 25 n.2.
The Court chose to "leave for another day" the applicability of the FAA to employment contracts.
Id.
60. Id. at26.
61. See id.at 30-33.
62. See id. at 33 (noting that these claims should be determined on a case-by-case basis).
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Gardner-DenverCourt) were "'far out of step with our current strong endorsement
of [arbitration as a] method of resolving disputes." 63
Consistent with this "strong endorsement" of arbitration, the Court was
unpersuaded by Gilmer's claim that he had been deprived of his rights under the
ADEA by being required to pursue the charges in arbitration." "' [B]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial
forum ; '65 Therefore, "'[h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies.'""
In taking these views, the Gilmer Court abandoned two of the most significant
principles upon which Gardner-Denver had been based. First, far from an
"inappropriate" forum for the resolution of statutory claims, the Court now heartily
endorsed the use of arbitration for this purpose.67 Second, whereas the Court in
Gardner-Denverhad ruled that an employee could not prospectively waive the right
to bring a Title VII suit in court, Gilmerheld that such a waiver was enforceable."3
Yet despite the fact that Gilmerwiped out so much of Gardner-Denver'sreasoning,
the Court declined to overrule Gardner-Denvercompletely.69 Instead, it held that
Mr. Gilmer's reliance on Gardner-Denverwas simply "misplaced" and explained
how Gilmer differed from its predecessor.7" In doing so, the Court enumerated
"several important distinctions" between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver."'
The first of these distinctions was that the agreement at issue in Gardner-Denver
did not authorize the arbitrator to resolve statutory claims. Because the employee
in Gardner-Denverhad never agreed to arbitrate his statutory claims, any ruling by
the arbitrator on Alexander's Title VII claim would have been outside the
arbitrator's authority and invalid. In Gilmer, however, the Court explained that the
clause both authorized arbitral resolution of statutory claims, and had been agreed
to by the employee.72
A second distinction cited in Gilmer was that in Gardner-Denverthe arbitration
agreement at issue was found within a collective bargaining agreement negotiated
by union and management. The Gilmer Court recalled that the "tension between
collective representation and individual statutory rights" had been cited in Gardner-

63.1d at30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989) (alteration added)).
64. See id.at 32-33.
65.Id at26 (quoting Mitsubisi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985) (alteration added)).
66. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 628 (alteration in original)).
67. Id at26; see asoAusfin v. Owens-BrockwayGlass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880 (4th
Cir. 1996) (noting that the "principal concern" in Gardner-Denverwas that arbitration was
"'inappropriate' for resolving statutory claims, but that Gilmer rejected that rationale) (quoting
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974)).
68. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
69. See id.at 33-35; see also, e.g., Salvatore &Fullerton, supra note 11, at 132 (explaining
that Gilmer distinguished itself from Gardner-Denverwithout overruling that case).
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
71.Id. at35.
72.Id.
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collective representation and individual statutory rights" had been cited in
Gardner-Denver as a basis for not upholding such mandatory arbitration
agreements." In Gilmer,though, the employee was not represented by a union, and
had personally signed the application containing the arbitration clause. Therefore,
the "tension" that concerned the Gardner-DenverCourt was "not applicable" in
74
Gilmer.
As the final distinction, the Court noted that unlike Gardner-Denver,Gilmerwas
decided pursuant to the FAA. Because the FAA expresses a strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration agreements, the Gilmer Court held that the statute cut in
favor of enforcing the Gilmer arbitration clause."
Thus, Gardner-Denver,perhaps barely, lived on. The extent to which it remained
good law after Gilmer,however, was unclear. 6 With these three distinctions as
their only guidance, the lower courts were forced to decide for themselves when
Gardner-Denvershould apply, and which cases fell under the new Gilmerrule.
C. Why the Courts Continue to Apply Gardner-Denver
Not surprisingly, when forced to decide whether to apply Gilmer or GardnerDenver, most courts have looked to the distinctions noted above, and cited the
"precedent" with facts most similar to those it faced. 7" Although there were three
distinguishing factors cited in Gilmer, courts most often look to one as being
determinative-the union or non-union status of the employee.78 If the employee is
represented by a union, courts will refuse to interpret the CBA's arbitration clause
as requiring mandatory arbitration of the statutory claim, with the opposite
generally true if the employee is non-union.
In supporting this distinction between union and non-union employees, courts
usually allude to the "tension" said to exist in a unionized workplace between
collective interests and individual rights, which was cited by both the GardnerDenver and Gilmer Courts. There are two reasons why courts cite this conflict
between the individual and the union as placing statutory claims beyond the reach
of arbitration clauses in CBAs.-" First, courts believe that an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims is enforceable only if the employee consents to it individually."
While the union can agree to all other "terms and conditions" of the individual's
employment, the union's agreement that those it represents will submit to
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims "does not count." 8' Second, the courts cite

73. Id.
74.Id.
75.Id.
76. SeePrynerv. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,365 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole, supra note 3,
at 594; Malin, supra note 15, at 81.
77. See, e.g., Pryner, 109 F.3d at 364-65 (comparing the facts in that case with those in
Gardner-Denverand Gilmer).
78. See Feller, supra note 50, at 58, 63.
79. See Salvatore & Fullerton, supra note 11, at 137.
80. See id.
81. Brisentine v. Stone &WebsterEng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519,526 (11th Cir. 1997).
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statutory claims.' If so, the employee would be left without a means for vindicating
his or her statutory rights. Courts conclude that the union's control creates too much
danger that an individual employee's rights would be undermined, perhaps in
exchange for benefits to the rest of the bargaining unit as a whole, or for some other
illicit purpose.8 4
Relying on these two factors which make up the "tension" in the union workplace,
the courts have clearly shown that the primary reason they apply either Gilmer or
Gardner-Denveris whether the employee is represented by a union." Even if the
union or non-union status is the only difference between cases in determining
whether Gilmer or Gardner-Denver should apply, the case law shows that the
lower courts believe "the only difference makes all the difference." 6
The other two "distinctions" cited in Gilmer-the applicability of the FAA, and
the fact that the CBA in Gardner-Denverdid not authorize the arbitrator to hear
statutory claims-have also been cited by the courts in their decisions on this issue.
These distinctions have played a far less important role, however, in deciding which
case to apply. In fact, courts disagree as to whether the FAA applies to CBAs, and
the Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue. Even if the FAA does not apply
it seems likely that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA")
would apply, and the presumption of arbitration under that statute is at least as
strong as under the FAA. 7 In any case, that Gardner-Denverand Gilmer differed
in the applicability of the FAA seems to have played little role in how courts decide
which opinion to apply.
The other distinction cited in Gilmer-thatin Gardner-Denverthe CBA did not
authorize the arbitrator to hear statutory claims-is somewhat more important. In
Wright v. UniversalMarifime Service Corp., the Supreme Court concluded that the
CBA at issue in that case did not authorize, with sufficient clarity, the arbitrator to
resolve statutory claims."8 Of course, the simple solution to this problem, which
would eliminate the distinction between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver,would be to
make it "clear and unmistakable"89 in the CBA that the arbitrator is authorized to
resolve statutory claims.9"

83. See Salvatore & Fullerton, supra note 11, at 137.
84. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,361-62 (7th Cir. 1997).
85. See Feller, supra note 50, at 63.
86. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Hall, J.,
dissenting). Judge Hall was responding to the majority's assertion that the "only
difference between" the facts of cases in which Gilmer applies and the facts in Austin was that
"this case arises in the context of a collective bargaining agreement" Id. at 885.
87. See Feller, supra note 50,at 60 (concluding that the applicability of the FAA in Gilmerwas
"a distinction... without a difference").
88. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct 391,396 (1998).
89. Id.
90. See Feller, supra note 50, at 60.
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II. UNION EMPLOYEES CAN CONSENT TO MANDATORY
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN THE SAME MANNER IN WHICH
NON-UNION EMPLOYEES AGREE TO THEM

We know that courts generally apply Gardner-Denverif the employee at issue
is represented by a union. The two reasons for doing so are, first, the belief that
only an individual employee can agree to mandatory arbitration of his or her
statutory claims, and, second, that the union's unilateral control over access to the
arbitral forum could endanger the individual employee's statutory rights. When
examined more closely, however, it becomes apparent that these justifications do
not warrant a separate rule for union and non-union employees.
A. Union Employees Can Give the Same Consent to
ArbitrationClauses as Non-Union Workers

Under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), once a union has been chosen
by employees to represent them, the union becomes the exclusive bargaining agent
on all matters concerning terms and conditions of employment. 9 Any effort by the
employer to bargain with the represented employees individually on such
matters-including which claims should be subject to mandatory
arbitration-would constitute a clear unfair labor practice under the NLRA.92
Because the union is the sole bargaining agent for employees, courts tend to hold
that unionized employees are unable to consent to arbitration clauses
"individually"--and because there is no individual consent, a mandatory arbitration
agreement will not be applied to an employee's statutory claims."
But if union employees could agree "individually" to mandatory arbitration of
their statutory claims, that would certainly change things. If individual consent
could occur in the unionized workplace, it would specifically undermine one of the
main justifications for continuing to recognize Gardner-Denver.In fact, when the
manner in which non-union employees give "individual" consent is actually
examined, it becomes clear that union employees are capable of providing the same
kind of consent that binds non-union employees to arbitrate their statutory claims.
B. How Non-Union Employees Agree to Arbitration
Clauses

In the non-union workplace, employees are not represented by unions, of course,
but agree to the terms of their employment on their own. But the notion that these
employees sit down at the "bargaining table" with their employers and hammer out
the their own, personalized employment contract is an illusion. An overwhelming

91. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5) (1994).
92. See, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678,685 (1944) (holding the
employer's "direct negotiation with its employees" who were represented by a union amounted
to an unfair labor practice).
93. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,363 (7th Cir. 1997).
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majority of these workers are never given the opportunity to personalize their
employment contracts in any way.9 4 Rather, the non-union, at-will workplace is
governed not by individualized employment agreements, but by form contracts,
employment manuals, and clauses in job applications, all of which include the terms
of employment set f6rth by the employer. It is within these "agreements" where
clauses mandating the arbitration of statutory claims are likely to be found.95
When employees are presented with such form agreements, they are not "asked"
by their employers to accept, or make a counter-offer. They are instead required to
accept, or look for another job. 6 For mandatory arbitration of statutory claims to
be included as just such a term of employment is not unusual.97 Yet, despite the fact
that these agreements are essentially contracts of adhesion, the employees in these
situations are still most often.held to their terms.9" Thus, although non-union
employees have no true opportunity to personally negotiate the terms of the
employment contract, they are nonetheless found to have consented to an arbitration
agreement contained within the contract.
Perhaps the best example of the manner in which non-union employees consent
to mandatory arbitration clauses is the seminal case on the issue, Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.99 Recall that in Gilmer, the plaintiff was "required
by his employment"'0 0 to submit an application registering him as a securities
representative, and it was within the application that the arbitration agreement was
contained.' 0 ' Mr. Gilmer had no opportunity to bargain with his employer for terms
that would have freed him from having to submit the application, nor could he have
negotiated a deal with the securities exchange that would have exempted him from
being covered by the mandatory arbitration clause. In other words, there was no
chance for the plaintiff in Gilmer to negotiate any sort of "side deal" that would
have allowed him to take the job, but kept him from having to arbitrate his statutory
claims-the terms were final, offered on a take it or leave it basis.

94. See Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory
ArbitrationofStatutoyAntidiscriminationRights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. &LAB. L. 347, 372-73
(1997).
95. See Ponte, supra note 1, at 360 (noting the various kinds of documents which contain
arbitration clauses).
96. See Cole, supra note 3, at 610-11.
97. See, e.g.,
Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,22 (1991) (showing that
the employee was required to sign an arbitration clause before beginning his job); Cole v. Bums
Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The contract at issue in Cole contained the
following provision which noted that waiver of the right to a trial was a serious matter, and that
the employee "MAY WISH TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY PRIOR TO SIGNING THIS
AGREEMENT.... HOWEVER, YOU WILL NOT BE OFFERED EMPLOYMENT UNTIL
THIS FORM IS SIGNED AND RETURNED BY YOU."Id. at 1469.
98. See Matthews, supra note 94, at 382-84. But cf Prudential Ins. Co. ofAm. v. Lai, 42 F.3d
1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiffs had not knowingly waived their right to
pursue judicial remedies by signing a form contract). The plaintiffs in Lai, however, were "recent
immigrants to the United States with limited language skills when they applied," Ponte, supra note
1, at 367. Therefore, Lai is likely to represent an atypical result
99. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
100. Id. at 23.
101. See id.
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Thus, when presented with the application, Gilmer had two choices. He could
either go ahead and submit the application, accept all of its terms, and have the job;
or he could reject the terms offered, including the mandatory arbitration provision,
by declining to take the job at alll---in other words, he could take it or leave it. Renegotiation of the particular terms was, of course, never an option. Eventually,
Gilmer decided that he should agree to the terms offered, and took the job. This, at
least according to the Supreme Court, provided the consent necessary to bind him
to arbitrate, despite the fact that he never could have negotiated for a different
contract.
Another example in which an employee was faced with similar, but actually more
difficult choices, was Lang v. BurlingtonNorthern RailroadCo.13 In that case, the
employee had worked for Burlington Northern for over twenty-five years when the
company adopted a new policy "calling for non-judicial resolution of claims arising
out of an employee's termination" by placing an arbitration clause in the.employee
handbook.'" Though he continued to work for the company over the next year, the
employee was eventually fired in 1992. He later filed suit against the employer in
federal district court for wrongful discharge."' 5
However, the district court dismissed his complaint, and required that he seek
relief in arbitration instead. The court found that the employee was bound to
arbitrate his claim by virtue of the new clause in the employee handbook." 6
Although he had worked for the company for such a long period of time, and the
change in the terms of employment had been unilaterally imposed by the employer,
the court found that the employee had provided adequate consent to the new
provision. "When, as here, a change in the employment relationship is proposed to
an employee, 'the employee's retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the
offer... .""' In other words, the employee had accepted the provision because he
."continu[ed] to stay on the job, although free to leave."ls Therefore, despite the
fact that he had been on the job for more than a quarter of a century, and was
afforded no opportunity to renegotiate terms unilaterally imposed on him by the
employer, the employee was still bound by the arbitration agreement because he
continued to work for the employer.
Just as in Gilmer, the employee in Lang was also given two choices when
confronted with the arbitration clause-either accept it and keep his job, or reject
it and quit By staying on the job, the court found that he had agreed to arbitrate his
disputes. Both of these cases show that consent to an arbitration agreement is valid,
even where there is no possibility of negotiation, and the only alternative is losing,

102. See Cole, supra note 3, at 610-11.
103. 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. M~nn.1993).
104.Id. at 1105.
105. See iJ
106. See id.at 1106.
107. Id. (quoting Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983)
(omission in original)).
108. Id. (quoting Meftille, 333 N.W.2d at 627 (alteration added)).
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or never getting, a job." 9 By staying on the job, or taking it in the first place, the
employee gives the required consent.
C. Union Employees
Again, in order to justify taking arbitration agreements out of the unionized
workplace, one of the most often-cited reasons is that union employees cannot give
the same kind of individual consent to arbitration agreements that their counterparts
in the non-union workplace can provide. This, however, is simply not true. ° When
compared to the individual "consent" to arbitration agreements courts found to have
occurred in the cases mentioned above, the manner in which union employees give
their consent to terms of employment is remarkably similar.
When an individual seeks a position in a unionized workplace, for example, he
or she is faced with the same decisions as was the applicant in Gilmer. Specifically,
the terms and conditions of employment in a unionized setting will already have
been determined, through bargaining between the union and management, before
the applicant has any chance to negotiate a separate deal. The chance for individual
negotiation is virtually eliminated by the exclusivity of the union's representation.
Therefore, if the union and employer have agreed on a clause requiring arbitration
of statutory claims, the applicant must make a decision. Either accept the job and
be bound by the arbitration agreement, or reject the job altogether. Whichever
option is chosen, the alternatives presented are identical to those in the non-union
workplace. If the job is accepted, the employee will have provided exactly the same
consent as that which was given in Gilmer."'
In the situation involving an employee already at work in a union workplace, the
employee is given the same opportunity as the Lang employee to accept or reject
a mandatory arbitration clause. If an employee has been on the job for a few years,
for example, and the union and employer agree that statutory claims will be subject
to mandatory arbitration, the union employee has at least the same two options as
the employee in Lang-continue working at the job, thereby accepting the new
terms of employment, or reject the terms and quit."' If the employee continues to

109. See Cole, supra note 3, at 610-11 (explaining thd choices which Gilmer had when
presented with the agreement); Gregory N. Freerkeen, The Changing Characterof Labor
Arbitration:LaborPerspective, in ARBITRATION 1992: IMPROVING ARBITRAL AND ADVOCACY
SKILLS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFrH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEmY OF

92,99 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1992) (noting that Gilmer had no opportunity to
renegotiate his contract).
110. Freerkeen notes that Gibnerand Gardner-Denvercannot be distinguished on the basis that
the employee in Gilmerhad an opportunity to personally negotiate the terms of his contract See
Freerkeen, supra note 109, at 99.
111. See Cole, supra note 3, at 610-11. Essentially, Cole argues that union and non-union
employees are presented with the same choices in these situations. Therefore, she believes that
there should be no recognition of any difference between Gilmer and Gardner-Denver.It is
noteworthy that the employer's counsel in Wright made a similar contention before the Supreme
Court during oral argument See Transcript of Oral Argument, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv.
Corp., 118 S.Ct 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889), availablein 1998 WL 721090, at *46 (Oct 7,
1998).
112.See id.
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work, he or she will have given consent in the exact same manner in which the
employee in Lang did so, regardless of the union's representation. Giving consent
in this manner does not, of course, violate any provision of the NLRA. Yet, it is
"individual" in the same way that the employees in Gilmer and Lang "individually"
agreed to the arbitration clauses in those cases.
Yet, some argue that there is one important distinction that justifies treating the
two differently. As noted above, under the NLRA individual unionized employees
are precluded from striking individual agreements with the employer, and must
adhere to the contract negotiated by the union and management. The situation in the
non-union workplace is virtually identical, with employees forced to adhere to the
terms presented with no opportunity to negotiate a different agreement. Professor
Martin Malin, for example, contends that although non-union employees have no
real chance to negotiate an agreement that does not include mandatory arbitration
of statutory claims, they "at least" have a "theoreticalpossibility of negotiating a
separate deal with their employers which did not require arbitration."" 3 Union
employees, on the other hand, have "no such choice."" 4 Thus, Malin says, the
consent provided by the non-union employee is somehow superior to that given by
the worker represented by a union.
This view is, to say the least, troublesome. When non-union employees are faced
with a mandatory arbitration clause in an employment contract, they do in fact have
a "theoretical" chance of bargaining for an agreement that does not contain the
arbitration clause. However, they have only a theoretical possibility of negotiating
for a different deal. The reality is that non-union, at-will workers simply have no
realistic chance to strike any agreement different to the one offered by the employer.
Indeed, if Malin's view were adopted, it would create a situation where "a union
and an employer could not agree to a result that an employer could impose
unilaterallyin the absence of a union.""' Malin's distinction-nothing more than
"empty formalism"-should be rejected." 6 Because union employees can consent
to mandatory arbitration clauses in the same manner that non-union employees
agree to them, the argument that those represented by a union cannot provide the
requisite "individual" consent should not be used as a basis for applying GardnerDenver.
III. CONCERN OVER THE UNION'S CONTROL OF AcCEss TO
ARBITRATION
In placing the arbitration of statutory claims outside of the union workplace,
courts have expressed another concern caused by the "tension" between collective
interests and individual statutory rights that supposedly exists in the union

113. Malin, supra note 15, at 87 (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Feller, supra note 50, at 81 (emphasis added). Who, I would ask, is more likely to better
represent the employees' interests-the union, or the employer? I do not suggest that the union
should or must agree to mandatory arbitration of statutory claims. Rather, I argue only that if
management and the union do, in fact, agree to such a clause, the agreement should be enforced.
This is, I think, a rather modest proposal.
116. Cole, supranote 3, at 611.
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workplace." 7 Under most CBAs, the union, and not the individual employee,
decides whether to pursue the employee's claim in arbitration."' Various factors
might play a role in the union's decision whether to arbitrate, such as the likelihood
of success, the merits of the case, and the seriousness of the discipline incurred by
the employee." 9 What concerns the courts is that the union might use other reasons
in deciding whether to arbitrate claims-such as trading off one claim for another,
or other more illicit purposes.'2" Thus, courts worry that if statutory claims were
covered under a mandatory arbitration clause, the union might use these improper
considerations in denying an employee access to arbitration, and the aggrieved
worker would have no means by which to vindicate his or her statutory rights.'
What courts fail to recognize, however, is that unions already have incentive to
take meritorious claims of employment discrimination to arbitration because of the
duty of fair representation ("DFR"). Although limited, the DFR has been broadened
enough over the years to allow disgruntled employees to recover from their unions
for harm suffered as a result of a union's wrongful conduct-or at least for the
employee to file suit for breach of the DFR, forcing the union to incur substantial
legal costs. Thus, while it is difficult for a represented employee to win a DFR suit,
unions fear such actions so much that their handling of grievances has changed to
the point that essentially any meritorious claim is taken to arbitration. There is no
reason to believe that the same would not hold true if statutory claims were placed
within the realm of arbitration clauses in CBAs.
A. Duty of FairRepresentation
All unions owe a duty of fair representation to the employees in the bargaining
unit First recognized in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RailroadCo.," the duty
was, at its inception, extremely limited.'23 In Steele, African-American union
members filed suit claiming their union had unfairly discriminated against them in
contract negotiations by making agreements adverse to their interests because of
their race. The Court held that in representing their members, unions had to act
"without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith."' 24 Initially,
Steele was seen as requiring only that the union act in "good faith" in order to

117. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974); see also, e.g., Brisentine v. Stone & Webster
Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 524-25 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing tension between collective interests
and individual rights where employees are represented by unions).
118. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,185,191 (1967).
119. See Stanley J. Schwatt Different Views ofthe Duty ofFairRepresentation,34 LAB. L.J.
415,420-26 (1983).
120. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,362-63 (7th Cir. 1997).
121. See id. at 362; see also Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 525.
122.323 U.S. 192 (1944).
123. See Harry T. Edwards, TheDuty ofFairRepresentation:A View From the Bench, in THE
CHANGNG LAW oF FArR REPmE
ATION 93,96-97 (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1985) [hereinafter
Tum CHANG N LAw].

124. Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
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satisfy its duty of fair representation, a view that prevailed for the next twenty
years.

125

Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court decided Vaca v. Sipes.'26 Vaca involved an
employee who filed a grievance with his union after being fired due to health
problems. Although the union initially pursued the claim through several steps of
the grievance process, it eventually decided to drop the employee's complaint short
of submitting it to arbitration, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to
make a successful case." 7 The employee, however, insisted that the dispute go
before the arbitrator. After the union refused, the employee filed suit, arguing that
the union's failure to submit his claim to arbitration breached the duty of fair
representation. 2 '
When the case finally reached the Supreme Court, the employee's claim was
rejected. The Court held that employees have no right to insist that a union arbitrate
a claim, and that unions enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to take an
employee's disputes to arbitration. 29 However, the Court did note that a union's
discretion is limited by the duty of fair representation, warning that a union may not
"arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion."' 30
Vaca has generally been interpreted as requiring the employee prove two things
in order to recover damages-(1) that the underlying grievance was meritorious in
the first place, and (2) that the union acted in "bad faith," processed the grievance
in a "perfunctory fashion," or "arbitrarily" failed to pursue it at all. 3' But these
criteria provided by the Vaca Court are rather vague, and there is no true consensus
on exactly what level of care Vaca requires of a union in order to fulfill its duty." 2
Where the union handles an employee's grievance, there is no set standard as to

125. See Ross E. Cheit, Competing Models of Fair Representation: The Perfunctory
ProcessingCases, 24 B.C. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1982).

126. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
127. The union had sent the employee to an outside physician to evaluate his claim that he was
medically fit to return to work. When the doctor concluded that he was not, the union decided that
it could not win at arbitration. See id. at 175.
128. See id. at 174-76.
129. See id. at 191.
130.Ia; see also ClydeW. Summers, The IndividualEmployee'sRights Under the Collective
Agreement: What ConstitutesFairRepresentation?,126 U. PA. L. Rnv. 251,259-61 (1977).

Summers explained thatwhile an "individual employee has no 'absolute right to have his grievance
taken to arbitration,"' id. at 260 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191), the Court in Vaca had
"emphasized that the union's exclusive control over grievance procedures did not carry with it
'unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of contract,"' id. at
260-61 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186).
The Vaca Court also noted that even if an employee could eventually show that the grievance
was valid, recovery against the union for failing to pursue it would certainly not be automatic.
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 192-93.
131. Cheit,supranote 125, at 10.
132. The uncertainty surrounding what the case requires prompted Professor Summers to
observe that Vaca "is like a giant squid. It has a number of procedural tentacles, any one ofwhich
may be more than we can master, but with all of which we must ultimately contend." Summers,
supra note 130, at 251.
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what constitutes an "arbitrary"' 33 refusal to take a claim to arbitration, or when the
union's performance in the arbitration process should be considered
"perfimctory."' 34 This lack of clarity has led unions, fearful that their actions might
constitute a breach of the DFR, to arbitrate more claims. Thus, while Vaca "should
have strengthened unions' independent evaluation of grievances," it actually "did
the opposite."' 33
Indeed, while lower courts interpreted Vaca as still requiring employees to meet
a "very heavy burden of proof"'36 in order to win a DFR suit, some courts did begin
to hold unions liable for unintentional acts that harmed employees. 37 Although none
of these decisions imposed liability on a union due to simple negligence, and it
seems clear that the failure to exercise ordinary care does not alone breach the
DFR, 38 what is also apparent is that some courts have required a higher level of
care by unions to satisfy their DFR. 39
Given these changes, it is safe to say that the law of the DFR has changed since
the Gardner-DenverCourt noted that "a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation may prove difficult to establish."' 4 ° While the employee still has a
relatively high burden of proof to show breach of duty, a union is now more likely
to be found liable than when Gardner-Denverwas decided.' 4'
In addition, and perhaps more important, while courts began to show more of a
willingness to find unions liable for breaching the DFR, the behavior of union
members started to change as well. Specifically, during the 1970s, union members
began to file DFR suits against their unions in much greater numbers. 4 While in

133. InAirLinePilotsAss'nv. O'Neill,499 U.S. 65 (1991), the Supreme Court reasoned that
an arbitrary decision would be one in which the union acted "irrationally," and outside of the
'wide range of reasonableness' unions are given in their decisionmaking. Id. at 79 (quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffinan, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)). Exactly how much guidance this provides as
to the meaning of "arbitrary" is questionable.
134. The "most detailed explanation" of the term is that a union has processed a grievance in
a "perfunctory" fashion where "'the union acted without concern or solicitude, or gave a claim
only cursory attention."' Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Beavers v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1741, 72 F.3d 97, 100 (8th Cir.
1995)). Of course, this raises the question as to what constitutes "cursory" attention, and so on.
135. GLADYS W. GRUENBERG ET AL., NATiONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORs, FIPTY YEARS IN
THEWORLD oFWoRK 69 (1998).

136. Edwards, supra note 123, at 93.
137. See id. at 97-101. Judge Edwards's view is that since Vaca was decided, lower courts
"have produced increasing, albeit inconsistent, judicial intervention in matters of... grievance
processing, and arbitration." Id. at 97. This has included an "expansion of the duty of fair
representation to include inadvertent conduct, i.e., conduct that is merely negligent rather than
deliberate or in bad faith." Id. at 100; see also Paul I Tobias, The Plaintiji'sPerception of
Litigation,in TE CHANGING LAW, supra note 123, at 128,138 (noting that "the majority of the
circuit courts now hold that it is not necessary to prove bad faith to show unfair representation").
138. See Edwards, supra note 123, at 100; see also United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S.

362, 372-73 (1990) (endorsing the viewthat mere negligence on part of the union is not sufficient
to support a claim of unfair representation).
139. See supra note 137.
140. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
141. See Edwards, supranote 123, at 96.
142. See Schwartz, supra note 119, at 419.
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the past, members were more likely to try to resolve conflicts with the union within
the organization itself, members started to "go to attorneys... almost without
provocation."' 43 Attributed to both a greater awareness of rights, as well as an
increased "aggressiveness" in enforcing them 44 disenchanted employees teamed
up with attorneys, and the number of claims filed for breach of duty skyrocketed.14
The unions, all too aware of their members' increasingly litigious behavior, were
forced to change the manner in which they performed their duties in order to avoid
DFR suits." 6 They knew that ifthey were eventually found to have failed to provide
fair representation, they could be liable to the employee for damages resulting from
the breach, including emotional distress," 7 attorneys fees," 8 and backpay awards." 9
With the courts chipping away at their discretion and DFR suits on the rise, union
officials had to take more and more caution in deciding which claims to pursue.
Yet, despite the increased number of suits, and the fact that courts have expanded
the scope of what might constitute a breach of the DFR, many who oppose
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the union workplace argue that the DFR
is an inadequate protection against union misconduct, because the union is still so
likely to prevail in any DFR suit.' The odds do indeed remain strongly in favor of
the union ultimately winning such cases."' However, even though the likelihood of
ultimately losing has not increased that greatly, the chances of being dragged into
court as a defendant have undeniably risen in much greater proportion. It is not, in
fact, the prospect of losing these cases that keeps unions in check. Rather, it is
simply the fear of finding themselves faced with lawsuits that has had the greatest
impact on the manner in which unions handle arbitration.5 2 Because the cost of
defending just one fair representation suit is so much greater than arbitrating

143. Id.
144. Id. at 419-20.
145.S ee Edwards, supranote 123, at 93-94 (labeling the rate of increase in fair representation
cases "quite extraordinary").
146. See Schwartz, supra note 119, at 420 (noting that members' behavior has had an
important impact on how unions operate).
147. See Cantrell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2021,32 F.3d 465 (10th Cir.
1994).
148.S ee e.g., Cruz v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148 (2d Cir.
1994).
149. See Bowen v. United States Postal Sere., 459 U.S. 212 (1983). Bowen dramatically
increased the potential liability of unions when found to have represented an employee unfairly.
In the past, unions were normally responsible only for damages such as attorneys fees incurred by
the employee in pursuing the breach claim. It was usually the employer who was liable for back
wages, as it was the employer's wrongful discharge ofthe employee in the first place which was
viewed as the cause for lost pay. However, in Bowen, the Court assumed that the employee would
have been reinstated at arbitration, and that a proportion of lost wages incurred after the point at
which the employee would have gone backto work could be collected from the union. See Tobias,
supra note 137, at 137 (observing that "[t]he Bowen case, with its added financial exposure for
unions, will undoubtedly accelerate the trend toward more arbitrations).
150. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,362 (7th Cir. 1997); Malin, supra note
15, at 87.
151.See Tobias,supra note 137, at 130-37 (exploring the "frustration" of employee-plaintiffs
in duty of fair representation cases).
152.S ee Schwartz, supra note 119, at 420.
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multiple claims, unions have started taking more precautions in exercising their
discretion... The mere specter of DER litigation has had a significant impact on the
54
manner in which unions now handle claims in the grievance process.'
The most obvious consequence is that most unions will now take even the most
borderline cases all the way to arbitration.' This is especially true with claims that
involve more serious charges, such as the discharge of an employee.'56 If an
employee expresses a strong desire to go to arbitration, the union is even more
likely to defer to the employee's wishes "regardless of merit."' 57 Rather than run the
risk of incurring a costly lawsuit, unions would rather play it safe and take the case
to arbitration. Therefore, despite the significant costs involved in arbitrating a
claim, unions would prefer the added expense of doing so in order to avoid an even
more costly DFR suit.
In sum, although breach of the DFR was terribly difficult to prove in the past, the
new standards of what constitutes fair representation have resulted in a greater
likelihood of employee success. Because unions are most likely aware that engaging
in the "subordination" of individual statutory rights might breach their duty, or at
least subject them to a DFR suit, they are now far less likely to commit such an act.
The increased chances that a court will uphold a finding of breach, greater potential
damage awards, and especially the increased odds of being sued in the first place,
have created a powerful incentive for unions to take many more claims to
arbitration, and provide fair representation while doing so. Even though employees
cannot always "insist" on taking their statutory claims to arbitration, the DFR
provides enough incentive for unions to take even claims of questionable merit
through the process.

153. See id at425-26; GRmEmERGETAL., supra note 135, at 69. When it comes to processing
grievances, and deciding whether to take them to arbitration, the "big fear for many unions" after
Vaca was the cost of having to litigate a DFR suit. Id. "Even if they were sure of winning at the
end ofthe process, they would still have to pay for the victory. Often it was cheaper to arbitrate a
dubious grievance than to risk a lawsuit for not doing so." Id.
154. It should probably be noted that unions are also vulnerable to suits under many of the same
discrimination statutes at issue in the statutoly arbitration cases, such as Title VIL However, while
unions could be sued under these statutes, just as they can for breach of duty, a violation of Title
VII for example, would constitute a breach of duty so blatant as to even meet the Steele standard.
Therefore, unions would appear to bejust as adverse to committing such an act as any other action
exposing them to a breach of duty violation. See Cole, supra note 3, at 607-10.
155. See Schwartz, supra note 119, at 424; Tobias, supranote 137, at 138 (noting that'Tear
of lawsuits has caused a marked increase in the number of arbitrations'). Another effect which
benefits employees is that, because unions fear breach suits so much, they take significantly more
care in how they handle claims. The result has been "that grievants are receiving better
representation." Id.
156. See Schwartz, supra note 119, at 421-22.
157. Id.at 421.
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B. IfArbitrationClauses in CBAs Are Applied to Statutory
Claims, Must the Employee Be Allowed to Insist on Taking
the Claim to Arbitration?
Some courts have hinted that if an employee were able to insist on taking a
statutory claim to arbitration, that would at least be a factor in favor of applying an
arbitration clause in a CBA to statutory claims." 8 It seems, though, that such a
requirement would do more harm than good. If all statutory claims were required
to go to arbitration simply upon an employee's insistence, a likely consequence
would be that only the weakest of claims would be affected. That is, because most
claims with even questionable merit already go to arbitration now because of the
fear of DFR suits, the only cases not currently arbitrated are, presumably, those not
even within the "borderline" category. Therefore, the only advantage an employee
would gain by such a rule would be the right to take a frivolous claim all the way
to arbitration.
Also, if employees were allowed by law to insist on going to arbitration with their
statutory claims, they could do so with impunity. The union and company-not the
employee-bear the expense of arbitration. 9 Therefore, there is absolutely no
incentive for an employee who has been discharged or disciplined not to bring a
statutory employment discrimination claim-even if it is frivolous-if he or she can
insist on arbitrating.' 60
In Vaca, the Supreme Court actually warned against allowing employees to insist
on arbitrating their claims, recognizing the harm that might result if such a rule
were adopted:
If the individual employee could compel arbitration of his grievance
regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the contract would
be substantially undermined, thus destroying the employer's confidence in the
union's authority ....Moreover, under such a rule, a significantly greater
number of grievances would proceed to arbitration. This would greatly increase
the cost of the grievance machinery and could so overburden the arbitration
process as to prevent it from functioning successfully. It can well be doubted
whetherthe parties to collective bargaining agreements would long continue to
provide for detailed grievance and arbitration procedures ...if their power to

158. See Brisentinc v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 527 (1lth Cir. 1997)
(requiring, as the third prong of a three-part test to determine whether a mandatory arbitration
clause would cover statutory claims, that the employee have "the right to insist on arbitration if the
federal statory claim is not resolved to his satisfaction in any grievance process?); see alsoPryner
v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the "[m]ost important"
factor in holding the plaintiffwas not required to arbitrate the statutory claim in that case was that
"the grievance and arbitration procedure can be invoked only by the union").
159. See, e.g., Freerkeen, supra note 109, at 108 (discussing the costs unions and employers
can expect to pay for arbitrators' services).
160. At least one commentator has suggested thai, as an alternative, employees could be allowed
to insist on arbitrating statutory claims if they did so at their own expense. See Ann C. Hodges,
ProtectingUnionizedEmployeesA ganst Dicrimination:The FourthCircuit'sMisinterpretation
of Supreme Court Precedent,2 EWPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 123, 163 (1998).
However, by Professor Hodges' own admission, such a requirement presents problems for all
parties involved. See id. at 164-66.
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settle the majority of grievances short of the costlier and more time-consuming
steps was 61
limited by a rule permitting the grievant unilaterally to invoke
arbitration.
The admonition of the Vaca Court is even more compelling today. Given the
already increased number of claims being taken to arbitration as a result of unions'
fear of lawsuits, adding frivolous complaints to the already crowded arbitration
mechanism would create a real danger of harm to the process, and to those who
need it to settle their legitimate claims.' 62 To allow unions to agree to mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims only where the employee has the right to insist on
arbitration of such claims would be both harmful and unnecessary. 63
In sum, although the DFR is still limited enough that a union is likely to win a
DFR suit filed against it, the fear of such'suits has caused unions to start taking
even the most borderline cases to arbitration. There is simply no reason to believe
that the same would not hold true with regard to arbitrating statutory claims. The
DFR provides employees with protection against having their statutory rights
undermined by a union unwilling to take their meritorious claim to arbitration. If
the claim truly has merit-even if it is borderline-the union will likely take it to
arbitration. Therefore, the "tension" that courts cite between unions and individual
employees is truly "an unfounded specter,"' 64 and should not be used as a basis for
refusing to apply mandatory arbitration agreements in CBAs to statutory claims.
IV. WIVGHT'S CONTRmUTiON TO THE ISSUE-TE "CLEAR
AND UNMISTAKABLE" REQUIREMENT

In Wright v. UniversalMaritime Service Corp., 6' the Supreme Court passed on
the opportunity to decide whether statutory claims can ever be subject to mandatory
arbitration by virtue of an arbitration clause in a CBA. It chose instead to hold that
arbitration could not be compelled in that particular case, finding that the CBA at
issue was not sufficiently clear that it required arbitration of statutory claims.'66 In
most cases, where such ambiguity exists as to whether a particular claim is subject
to arbitration, there is an initial presumption that the claim is arbitrable. In Wright,
however, the Court held that statutory claims are never presumedto be arbitrable
under a CBA.

161. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
162. Judge Edwards noted that the increase in claims in arbitration attributable to litigation
aversion has already endangered the process. Edwards, supra note 123, at 94-96. Therefore, it
would be reasonable to assume that even more claims would exacerbate the already existing
problem.
163. Although some of the reasons why unions now take more claims to arbitration were
explained above, why they go to arbitration is not the issue. Rather, the most important
consideration is that they do go to arbitration. Therefore, the concern over subordinating rights
does not seem to be viewed as a real problem any longer.
164. Salvatore & Fullerton, supra note 11, at 140.
165.119 S. Ct. 391 (1998).
166. See id. at 397.
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Instead, the Court explained, in order for such a clause to be enforceable, the
"CBA requirement to arbitrate [statutory claims] must be particularly clear." 67 In
other words, the clause must be "'clear and unmistakable"' that it covers statutory
claims."6 Although the Wright Court recognized that much of Gardner-Denverwas
undermined by Gilmer, it explained that "Gardner-Denverat least stands for the
proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to
be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA."' 69
Assuming the Court eventually decides that statutory claims can be covered by
a mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA, the question still to be decided is what
constitutes the kind of "clear and unmistakable" language sufficient to satisfy
Wright. Unfortunately, while the Court announced this standard in Wright, it did
little to expand on exactly what "clear and unmistakable" means. A closer look at
Wright, as well as some cases from the lower courts applying the decision, should
help in understanding exactly what language is clear and unmistakable enough to
fulfill the Wright requirement.
A. "General"ArbitrationClauses Will Not Suffice
In Wright, the CBA at issue contained a "very general" clause that required
arbitration of all "'[m]atters under dispute.' 170 The employer argued that this broad
clause covered the employee's ADA claim, and that he should have been required
to submit the "matter" to binding arbitration. 17' This contention had, in fact, been
successful at the court of appeals, where "the Fourth Circuit relied upon the fact
that the equivalently broad arbitration clause in Gilmer-applying to 'any dispute,
claim or controversy'-was held to embrace federal statutory claims." 72 Therefore,
because the broad arbitration agreement in Gilmer was enforced, the employer
argued claimed that the clause at issue in Wright should be enforced as well.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. While accepting the fact that the
arbitration clauses in Wright and Gilmer were similar in construction, the Court
explained that the two agreements were subject to different standards. "Gilmer
involved an individual's waiver of his own rights, rather than a union's waiver of
the rights of represented employees-and hence the 'clear and unmistakable'
standard was not applicable."' 73 The Court went on to find that, when the clear and
unmistakable standard was applied to the clause in Wright, the agreement was not
sufficiently clear to compel arbitration.7
After Wright, it is clear that a broad, general arbitration clause-a Gilmer-ike
clause-in a CBA will not meet the clear and unmistakable standard. While these
general arbitration agreements continue to be applied in cases involving non-union

167. Id. at 396.

168. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693,708 (1983)).
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting App. 43a (alteration in original)).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 397.
173. Id.
174. See id.
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employees, even after Wright,17 the same clauses will be ineffective in the union
workplace. 176
B. "Incorporating"FederalLaws into the CBA.
The CBA in Wright also stated that "'this Agreement is intended to cover all
matters affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"'
and, further, "'that no provision or part of this Agreement shall be violative of any
Federal or State Law. ",177The employer claimed that these clauses "incorporated"
the ADA into the CBA. As a result, the employer argued, the arbitrator was
required to apply "'legal definitions derived from the ADA' in determining whether
Wright is 'qualified' for employment within the meaning of the CBA," and
compliance with the ADA had become a term of the CBA, subject to mandatory
178
arbitration.
The Court was not persuaded by these arguments. Although the CBA purported
to cover "all matters" concerning terms and conditions of employment, the Court
called it "doubtful" that such a general clause could "be considered a clear and
unmistakable incorporation of employment discrimination laws.' 179 Indeed, even
if it could be considered such "in isolation," the Court explained that the effect of
the clause was undone by a subsequent provision in the CBA noting that
"'[a]nything not contained in this Agreement shall not be construed as being part
of this Agreement. """
Further, the language in the CBA explaining that the agreement was intended to
comply with all state and federal laws was also found insufficient to constitute an
"incorporation" of the ADA. Specifically, the Court noted that despite this general
provision, compliance with another federal law-OSHA-was specifically required
by the CBA. If the general provision was intended to incorporate all federal laws,
the Court reasoned, then under the employer's "interpretation" of the agreement,
the "OSHA provision would be superfluous."' 8'
In the end, it seems plain that neither a general provision in a CBA purporting to
cover "all matters" concerning "terms and conditions of employment," nor a clause
showing the parties' intent that the CBA comply with all federal laws, constitutes
a clear and unmistakable incorporation of federal law into the CBA.

175. See, e.g., Stanton v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 98-4989,1999 WL 236603, at *4 (ED. Pa.
Apr.20,1999). Stantoninvolved a non-union employee, and the same Form U-4 that was at issue
in Gilmer.The court in Stanton dismissed the employee's reliance on the recent Wright decision,
explaining that the "validity of the arbitration provision in this action is governed by Gilmer rather
than Wright."Id.
176. See Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., No. 97-2240,1999 WL 254438 (4th Cir. Apr. 29,1999);
Prince v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 37 F. Supp.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
177. Wright, 119 S. Ct at 397 (quoting Apps. 45a-46a, 47a).
178. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 39).
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting App. 46a (alteration in original)).
181. Id.
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C. What Does Meet the Clearand Unmistakable
Standard?
What should be clear by now is that broad arbitration clauses purporting to cover
"all claims" are not clear and unmistakable. Nor will general statements in a CBA
that the parties mean for the agreement to be consistent with state and federal laws
be considered a valid incorporation. Both will fail the clear and unmistakable test
because they lack the specificity that is key in showing the parties' intent" for
statutory claims to be covered by the mandatory arbitration clause. Because there
is no presumption that the parties intend for statutory claims to be arbitrable, the
intent should be evident on the face of the CBA through "ordinary textual
analysis. '8
As the Fourth Circuit recently explained, the "most straightforward" approach to
making the parties' intent clear "simply involves drafting an explicit arbitration
clause."' 4 The CBA should specifically state that employees are required to
"submit to arbitration all federal causes of action arising out of their
employment." 8 " In addition to mentioning "federal claims" generally, the CBA
should also list the individual federal statutes covered under the arbitration
clause.'86 In doing so, any confusion as to what claims the parties intended to make
subject to arbitration would be alleviated, and the clear and unmistakable standard
would surely be met.
A second, and perhaps less "clear" approach, is to use a general arbitration
clause coupled with the specific incorporation of particular statutes into the CBA.' 7
In Wright, the Court indicated that such incorporation could make compliance with
these laws "a contractual commitment that would be subject to the arbitration
clause." 8 8 The key here, again, is specificity. The clear and unmistakable test
requires that, for incorporation to be effective, the CBA must expressly cite the
statutes to be integrated as part of the CBA. This involves listing "by name or

182. In Carson, for example, the court noted that "the determination of what disputes are
arbitrable is focused on the intent of the parties." Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., No. 97-2240, 1999
WL 254438, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 1999) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications
Workers ofAm., 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986)).
183. Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396.
184. Carson,1999 WL 254438, at *6.
185.Id.
186.See Prince v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 37 F. Supp.2d 289,293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding
the clause at issue deficient, in part, because it failed "to identify the statutes by name or citation").
In Carson,the Fourth Circuit indicated that it would require only that the CBA state that all federal
claims generally are subject to arbitration. See Carson, 1999 WL 254438, at *6. It seems to me
that the better rule is to require that all statutes covered by the CBA be listed in order for the
agreement to be enforced. This would ensure that the parties' intent is made absolutely clear. At
the very least, even if courts eventually do side with the Fourth Circuit's view, drafting a CBA that
included a specific enumeration of the laws subject to mandatoiy arbitration would seem to be a
good way to avoid litigation on the issue of the scope of the arbitration clause.
187. See Carson, 1999 WL 254438, at *6.
188. Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 397; see also Carson, 1999 WL 254438, at *6.
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citation" 89 every statute meant to be incorporated into the CBA. Failure to do so
will constitute a "less-than-explicit' 9 incorporation, and the clear and
unmistakable test will not be satisfied. While perhaps a less certain approach than
the "explicit arbitration clause" option, express incorporation of federal statutes
into the CBA, coupled with a general arbitration clause, should satisfy the clear and
unmistakable test.
CONCLUSION
After Gilmer undermined so much of Gardner-Denver'sreasoning, the only
remaining basis for refusing to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in CBAs when
the dispute involves statutory claims is the union or non-union status of the
employee. But unionized employees can consent to mandatory arbitration clauses
contained in CBAs in the exact same manner as employees do in the non-union
workplace. Further, the union's duty of fair representation, and fear of having to
defend a suit for an alleged breach, provides adequate incentive for unions to take
even the most borderline claims to arbitration. The same would hold true if
statutory employment discrimination claims fell under a mandatory arbitration
clause in a CBA. Therefore, so long as it is "clear and unmistakable," as required
by Wright, that the union and employer intended for statutory claims to be covered
by the mandatory arbitration clause in the CBA, union employees should be
required to submit their claims to arbitration.

189. Prince,37 F. Supp.2d at 293.
190. Wright, 119 S. Ct. at 396.

